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SURVEY SECTION
Criminal Procedure. City of Warwick v. Adams, 772 A.2d 476
(R.I. 2001). The Rhode Island supreme court held that: (1) the stat-
ute that allows bail commissioners to accept pleas of not guilty in
misdemeanor cases is valid and does not conflict with the district
court's rules; (2) the petitioner had a unilateral right to withdraw
waiver of trial by jury before the expiration of the ten-day period
that began to run after his initial appearance before the district
court or judge of that court, but not after his initial appearance
before the bail commissioner; and (3) the absence of counsel during
a proceeding before the bail commissioner constituted good cause
to revoke waiver of jury trial after the expiration of the ten-day
period.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Petitioner Mark Adams waived his right to a jury trial during
a preliminary hearing at the Warwick police station, where he was
charged with assault.' After consulting with an attorney, Adams
attempted to revoke his waiver in district court within ten days of
the preliminary hearing, but was not allowed to do SO. 2 Defend-
ants charged with misdemeanors are usually given the opportunity
to waive their right to a jury trial when they appear before a bail
commissioner. 3 According to the Attorney General, most district
court judges are reasonable in allowing a defendant to withdraw a
waiver of jury trial, before or after the ten days following the defen-
dant's initial court appearance, and that this instance was an
anomaly.4
BACKGROUND
Rhode Island General Laws section 12-10-2 enumerates the
powers of bail commissioners. 5 Under this section, they are au-
thorized to "accept pleas of not guilty," and then "schedule a pre-
trial conference date before a judge of the district court."6 Further,
an administrative order by the chief judge of the district court
specifies the procedures bail commissioners must follow "when
1. City of Warwick v. Adams, 772 A.2d 476, 477 (R.I. 2001).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 478.
4. Id.
5. R.I. Gen. Laws §12-10-2 (1997).
6. Id. at § 2-10-2(b).
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conducting arraignments in misdemeanor cases and initial appear-
ances in felony cases."7
Adams presented three issues in his request for certiorari from
the Rhode Island Supreme Court. First, he argued that a bail com-
missioner may not conduct the arraignments set out in the admin-
istrative order, contending that the administrative order that
grants bail commissioners "full-fledged power to arraign" is unau-
thorized.8 Therefore, he argues, there was a conflict between the
statute and the administrative orderY
The petitioner argued that these initial proceedings before the
bail commissioners should not be considered arraignments because
they are not held in open court. 10 Further, Adams contends that
as a matter of public policy, defendants should not be allowed to
waive jury rights outside of court. 1 '
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The state supreme court found that the administrative order
does not extend the powers of bail commissioners beyond those
provided in section 12-10-2.12 Relying on the fact that bail com-
missioners may only accept pleas of not guilty in misdemeanor
cases (thus leaving discretion to the courts on pleas of guilty or
nolo contendere), it states that "[allthough the administrative or-
der refers to this process as a 'special arraignment,' it does not con-
stitute an arraignment as that term is used in the district court's
Rules of Criminal Procedure because it does not occur 'in open
court.'"1
3
Further, the district court Rules leave room for statutory ad-
justment in the way in which the defendant can make an initial
appearance after arrest as is provided in section 12-10-2, and, to
obtain release on bail. 14 Although the district court Rules do not
specifically provide for all the bail commissioners' authority given
7. Adams, 772 A.2d at 478 (citing District Court Administrative Order 88-
18).
8. Id. at 478.
9. Id. at 479.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 478.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 479.
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under section 12-10-2, the court found there was no necessary con-
flict between them.' 5
Finally, Adams requested that the state supreme court find
that his initial appearance before the bail commissioner was inva-
lid, that he had a unilateral right to revoke his waiver within the
ten-day period after that appearance, and that absence of the op-
portunity to consult with counsel prior to executing the waiver con-
stituted good cause to allow him to waive the right after ten days.16
The request to invalidate the bail commissioner proceedings
was denied. The court did rule that Adams had the unilateral right
to withdraw his jury trial waiver at any time before the ten day
period began to run after his initial appearance before the district
court, but not after the bail commissioner hearing. However, the
court did find that the absence of counsel during the bail commis-
sioner proceeding constituted good cause to revoke the jury trial
waiver after the ten-day period.17
CONCLUSION
In City of Warwick v. Adams, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
held that the statute that allows bail commissioners to accept not
guilty pleas in misdemeanor cases does not conflict with the dis-
trict court's rules and is therefore valid. The petitioner had a uni-
lateral right to withdraw his jury trial waiver before expiration of
ten-day period after an appearance before the district court but not
after an appearance in front of the bail commissioner. The absence
of counsel during a bail commissioner proceeding constituted good
cause to revoke jury trial waiver after the expiration of the ten-day
period.
Betsy Wall
15. Id. at 481.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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Criminal Procedure/Evidence. State v. Lynch, 770 A.2d 840
(R.I. 2001). The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that: (1) pre-
trial photo identification procedure was not unduly suggestive; (2)
jury instruction on victim's identification testimony was sufficient;
(3) now-deceased declarant's statement to police officer was admis-
sible under excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule; (4) jury
instruction on flight was sufficient; and (5) defendant was not enti-
tled to a jury instruction on the use of force to retain property al-
ready peacefully taken.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On September 19, 1994 at approximately 7:30pm, the defen-
dant, David Lynch, attacked a young woman as she was leaving a
gas station in Providence.' Lynch held a knife to her throat and
demanded that she give him her backpack.2 The victim, who was
in shock, stared at the defendant for approximately 10-15 seconds
before the defendant reached into the car and took the backpack.3
The victim then proceeded to chase the defendant on foot.4 At one
point, the defendant turned and ran towards the victim before
dropping the backpack and continuing to run.5 The victim stopped
to pick up her belongings and waited for the police to arrive.6
An eyewitness to the events chased the defendant to a nearby
post-office. 7 During the struggle between them, the defendant
stabbed the witness in the hand." When the police officer arrived
at the scene, the witness explained what had happened.9 Because
the defendant appeared almost unconscious from the struggle, the
police officer put him in the back of the police car without hand-
cuffs or restraints. 10 The officer then proceeded to search the area
for the knife the defendant had used in the robbery and stabbing."
At this point, the police officer got into the cruiser, and started the
1. State v. Lynch, 770 A.2d 840, 842 (R.I. 2001).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 842-43.
4. Id. at 843.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 843, 848.
11. Id. at 843.
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car with the intent of taking the defendant to a line-up for identifi-
cation.12 Before he could leave, however, an ambulance arrived
and the officer left his cruiser to speak with the paramedics.13 The
defendant climbed into the front of the cruiser and fled the scene. 14
The defendant hit the officer in the knee with the car, and the of-
ficer fired shots at the defendant.15 After crashing into a utility
pole two-tenths of a mile from the post-office, the defendant was
again apprehended and required hospitalization, and thus the vic-
tim did not have the opportunity to view a line-up at that time.16
The victim later identified Lynch as the man who attacked her
from a photo array before she testified before the grand jury.' 7
Following a jury trial, Lynch was convicted of robbery in the first
degree, assault with a deadly weapon against the officer, robbery of
the officer in the second degree, and escape from lawful custody.' 8
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The defendant raised several issues on appeal. First, he con-
tends that the trial justice erred in denying his motion to suppress
the victim's identification testimony.19 The Rhode Island Supreme
Court employed a two-pronged analysis to determine whether an
out-of court identification violates a defendant's due process
rights.20 Relying on State v. Gardiner,21 the court stated that the
first step is to determine "whether the identification procedure
used was unnecessarily suggestive."22 The court further stated
that the procedure was not unnecessarily suggestive; the trial
judge does not need to proceed to the second prong.23 The defen-
dant claims that the photo array procedure was unnecessarily sug-
gestive because it was made ten weeks after the incident and that
the defendant was depicted with more facial hair than the other
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 843, 845.
17. Id. at 844.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 636 A.2d 710, 715 (R.I. 1994).
22. Lynch, 770 A.2d at 844.
23. Id.
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photos.24 This court ruled that the photo array was not unduly
suggestive because the lapse of time between the incident and the
identification goes to the weight given the identification, not to the
suggestiveness.25 The court further stated that the photos were a
fair comparison that in no way infringed upon Lynch's due process
rights.26 The court also noted that the victim had adequate oppor-
tunity to look at Lynch while he held the knife to her throat, and
further that the defendant was unavailable for a line up because of
his hospitalization. 27
The defendant also claims that the instruction given to the
jury regarding the identification was erroneous. 28 The defendant
objected because the trial justice did not include specifically re-
quested language, which instructed the jury that it must take into
account the victim's level of certainty that Lynch was the perpetra-
tor.29 The court stated that under Rhode Island law, there is no
requirement for particular language to be used in jury instruc-
tions. 30 The law only requires the trial justice to instruct the jury
on the applicable law in the case, regardless of the words he or she
chooses to do so. 31 As a result, the court concluded that the trial
justice's instruction was sufficient. 32
The next issue on appeal is the statement that the eyewitness,
who died before trial, made to the police officer at the post office.33
The defendant claims admission of this statement amounted to re-
versible error because the statement lacked reliability.34 The trial
court relied on Rule 804(c) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, 35
and allowed the statement in as a declaration. 36 The court found
that the statement contained adequate reliability because it satis-
24. Id.
25. Id. at 845.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id
29. Id.
30. Id. at 846 (citing R.I. Gen. Laws §8-2-38 (1997)).
31. Id. at 846.
32. Id. at 846-47.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. R.I. R. Evid. 804(c) (stating "A declaration of a deceased person shall not
be made inadmissible in evidence as hearsay if the court finds that it was made in
good faith before the commencement of the action and upon the personal knowl-
edge of the declarant.").
36. Lynch, 770 A.2d at 847.
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fled the requirements of an excited utterance under Rule 803(2). 3 7
The court relied on the testimony of the police officer, which de-
scribed the witness as being excited and out of breath at the time
he made the statement.38 Further, the defendant attempted to im-
peach the credibility of the declarant by introducing evidence of
the declarant's criminal record.39 Thus, the court stated, the jury
had the benefit of this information in determining whether the
statement was reliable, and the admission of the statement did not
constitute reversible error.40
The next challenge brought by the defendant was against the
jury instruction on flight with respect to his leaving the scene. 41
Lynch contended that the trial justice committed reversible error
for not explaining that consciousness of guilt is not the only poten-
tial reason for flight.42 The court rejected this argument, stating
that the evidence of flight in this case was overwhelming. 43 The
court further stated that the instruction on flight was consistent
with this evidence and that the jury was properly instructed that a
permissible, but not mandatory, inference of consciousness of guilt
could be drawn.44
Finally, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred in
rejecting the defendant's requested jury instruction regarding the
robbery of the police car.45 The requested instruction stated, "a
defendant's use of force to retain property already peacefully
taken, or attempt to escape, is not the force essential to satisfy the
element of force required for robbery."46 However, the trial justice
rejected this instruction because they determined the car was not
peacefully taken.47 Specifically, the trial court relied on the fact
that despite his injuries, Lynch got into the front seat of the car,
37. Id. at 847 (citing R.I. R. Evid. 803(2), defining an excited utterance as "a
statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was
under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.").
38. Id. at 847.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 847-48.
41. Id. at 848.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 849.
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and drove toward the officer, hitting him in the process.48 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court agreed that this was highly sugges-
tive of the exertion of force necessary to satisfy the element of force
in robbery. 49 As a result, the defendant's conviction was affirmed
and his appeal was denied and dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree, assault
with a deadly weapon against a police officer, robbery of the officer
in the second degree, and escape from lawful custody of the Provi-
dence police. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that: (1) the
victims' pretrial photo identification procedure was not unduly
suggestive; (2) jury instruction on victim's identification testimony
was sufficient; (3) now-deceased declarant's statement to police of-
ficer was admissible under the excited utterance exception to hear-
say rule; (4) jury instruction on flight was adequate; and (5)
defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on the use of force
to retain property already peacefully taken because the trial court
determined the property was not peacefully taken.
Betsy Wall
48. Id. at 848.
49. Id. at 848-49.
